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Abstract— API call hooking is a technique that malware 
researchers use to mine malware’s API calls. These API calls is 
used to represent malware’s behavior, for use in malware 
analysis, classification or detection of samples. In this paper, 
analysis of current Windows API call hooking techniques is 
presented where surprisingly, it was found that detection of each 
technique can be done trivially in memory. This could lead to 
malware being able to sense the presence of API call hooking 
techniques and modifying their behavior during runtime. 
Suggestions for a better API call hooking technique are presented 
towards the end of the paper. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Application Programming Interface (API) calls is a popular 
dynamic feature used in malware research and this can be 
clearly seen in the number of research papers that chose API 
calls as a dynamic feature for representing malware’s behavior 
[1][2][3][4][5]. API calls are basically functions that a program 
(malware included) invokes during its execution. APIs simplify 
the work of writing portable code by abstracting lower level 
functions into a set of stable, portable interface that 
programmers can use to ensure reliable operation of their 
software. The idea of using API calls as a dynamic feature of 
malware depends on the fact that different programs might 
work in a different way and thus, use different sets of APIs. 
The difference could be in the APIs that was called, the 
parameters that was used in an API call (if any), or even in the 
order in which the APIs are invoked.  
There are several types of API as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Basically, there are language specific APIs, and Operating 
System (OS) specific APIs. The OS specific APIs, in case of 
Windows OS, can be further divided into User-mode APIs, 
Native APIs, and Kernel-mode APIs. Table 1 shows sample 
API calls at each level that performs the file open operation. 
Language specific APIs are OS dependent and the APIs are 
implemented by calling the underlying OS’s API. Linux based 
systems have libc or GNU C library (glibc) that will expose the 
C APIs while in Windows, the C Runtime (CRT) library is 
exposing the C APIs. These libraries call the underlying APIs 
in order to implement a specific function. This can be verified 
by tracing an API call in runtime using a debugger. For 
example, the fopen API call in Windows, will at some point, 
result in a call to the CreateFile API, which will later call the 
native API NtCreateFile before a switch to kernel mode code is 
being made. 
API names are very descriptive and the name itself 
describes the function that it carries. Capturing API calls made 
by malware during execution will shed some light on its 
activities which can be used as an indicator to represent its 
behavior. The issue is, can we trust the list of APIs obtained 
from current API call hooking techniques? 
Figure 1.  APIs in Windows OS 
TABLE I.  SAMPLE APIS 
API Example Sample API call 
C fopen 
VB6 Open filename For Input As #fileNum 
Windows API CreateFile 
Native API NtCreateFile 
 
II. MOTIVATION 
Malware can detect the environment in which they are 
being executed and determine whether they are being analyzed 
or not. Such malware are known as ‘environment-aware’ 
malware and can modify their behavior during runtime in order 
to evade detection. There have been research done on malware 
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[6][7]. VM and emulators are among the technologies used to 
provide a safe execution environment for executing malware 
samples. API call monitoring on the other hand, is a technique 
used to gather a list of API calls issued by malware during 
runtime [8][9][10]. The list can be used to give an insight into 
the behavioral aspects of a malware sample. If malware can 
detect the presence of API hooking techniques, there is a 
possibility that malware can change its behavior. Therefore, 
this research focuses on the possibility of detecting the 
presence of API call hooking techniques in memory, during 
runtime. 
III. EXISTING WINDOWS API CALL HOOKING TECHNIQUE 
API call hooking is possible in both Windows and Linux. 
However, this paper will focus on API call hooking for the 
Windows OS, specifically on user mode API calls. There are 
several well-known techniques for user mode API call 
hooking. These are Import Address Table (IAT) Hook [8], 
Debugger Hook [9], and Inline Hook [10]. The following 
subsections discuss each of the abovementioned techniques. 
A. Import Address Table Hook 
Import Address Table (IAT) Hook is an API hooking 
technique that works by modifying the IAT [8], located at the 
header of the Portable Executable (PE) file [11]. PE is the file 
format used by Windows executable files [11]. Inside a PE file 
header, there contains a data structure called the Import 
Address Table (IAT) which is used by Windows to link 
application with APIs [11]. These APIs are actually exported 
functions of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL). The main idea of 
IAT hooking is to modify these pointers so that instead of 
pointing to APIs, it will point to a stub that will log API calls 
and later forwards them to the actual API [8]. Figure 2 shows a 
structural view of the PE headers of an executable file, pointing 
towards the IAT. 
An application invokes an API by using the CALL 
instruction [12]. Figure 3 presents a disassembly of an 
application (in memory), showing how an indirect call 
instruction refers to an address inside the IAT. The call 
instructions in Figure 3 (CALL DWORD PTR DS:[00408000], 
and CALL DWORD PTR DS:[00408008]) are indirect calls, 
which will cause code execution to jump to the addresses 
pointed to by the operand (memory address) of the indirect call 
instruction. 
Therefore, it is possible to hook API calls made using the 
indirect call instruction by modifying the memory addresses 
inside the IAT, pointing it to a to a stub that will record the API 
call being made and redirect code execution back to the 
original address contained in the original IAT (to maintain the 
original API functionality) [8]. 
B. Debugger Hook 
Debugger hook works by running a debugger that ‘debugs’ 
a target application, waiting for an injected breakpoint to 
trigger an exception [9]. API hooking is achieved by having the 
debugger placing a breakpoint at the entry point of an API [9]. 
Technically, a breakpoint is placed by overwriting the entry 
point with certain CPU specific instruction (e.g. INT 3 
instruction for IA-32) that causes the CPU to throw a Debug 
Exception whenever the current Instruction Pointer (IP) points 
to the instruction [12]. The exception will be caught by the 
debugger and the address of which the exception occurs would 
be used to identify which API is currently being accessed by 
the target application. 
C. Inline Hook 
Inline hook is a technique made famous by Hunt and 
Brubacher [10]. Inline hook works by modifying the entry 
point of an API with code that will redirect code execution to a 
function known as the Detour Function. Detour Function is the 
first block of code that gets executed once an API has been 
intercepted. In case of API hooking, Detour Function usually 
contains code that will log API calls. Overwriting the entry 
point of the API destroys its original functionality since 
portions of the original code is lost. Because of this, prior to the 
modification (to the entry point), instructions from the entry 
point is first copied to a different memory location. These 
instructions are referred to as the Trampoline Function. Figure 
4 shows the execution flow of a program calling an API, before 
and after Inline Hook is set to capture API calls. 
Once an Inline hooked API is invoked, the entry point of 
the API will redirect code execution to the Detour Function. 
The Detour Function will execute and once done, it will jump 
to the Trampoline Function, executing the original 
(overwritten) instructions before a jump to the remainder of the 
 
Figure 2.  IAT inside a PE file 
 
Figure 3.  The relationship between indirect calls and IAT 
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API instruction is being made (see Figure 4). This flow of code 
execution will ensure that modifications made to the entry 
point of an API will not affect the original functionality of the 
API. The above mentioned technique serves as the most basic 
form of an Inline hook. Actually, a number of variations can be 
made to the above technique, especially in the type of 
instructions used to overwrite the entry point with. Below is a 
list of several possible instructions that can be used at the entry 
point of an API (on an IA-32 system): 
1. Direct JMP instruction. 
2. Indirect JMP instruction. 
3. PUSH, RET combination. 
4. JMP SHORT, JMP NEAR combination 
The most interesting variant is the “JMP SHORT, JMP 
NEAR combination”, which involves the use of two JMP 
instructions. In certain cases, the use of this variant will not 
require the use of a Trampoline Function. However, the most 
important rule for this (Inline hooking without a Trampoline 
Function) to work is the availability of a two byte, ‘do-nothing’ 
instruction at the entry point of an API, and 5 unused bytes 
close to the entry point or around -125 to +129 bytes from the 
entry point of the API [12]. In Windows, these requirements 
can be met by compiling an API with the “/hotpatch” option 
[13] and most of the Windows API are compiled with the 
“/hotpatch” option (can be observed by disassembling 
Windows API in memory). The “/hotpatch” option generates 5 
padding bytes (using NOP or INT 3 instructions) prior to the 
entry point of an API, and a two byte ‘do-nothing’ instruction 
at the entry point of an API (see Figure 5(a)). Among the 
popular two byte ‘do-nothing’ instructions at the entry point of 
an API (based on an observation in Windows 7 32-bit) are: 
1. MOV EDI, EDI 
2. MOV EAX, EAX 
These two bytes ‘do-nothing’ instructions are safe to 
overwrite with a JMP SHORT instruction, pointing to the start 
of the 5 padding bytes. The 5 padding bytes will be overwritten 
with a JMP NEAR instruction, pointing to the Detour function. 
 
 
Figure 4.  (a) Normal API call code execution flow, and                               
(b) Inline hook in action 
 This in effect will cause code execution to jump from the 
entry point of an API to the Detour Function (see Figure 5). 
The JMP NEAR instruction is needed because the JMP 
SHORT instruction could not be used to redirect code 
execution to the Detour Function due to its small jump range. It 
would be very difficult to find free memory space to place the 
Detour Function inside the module that contains the API (since 
most of the memory space would be fully occupied with 
executable code that implements various APIs) and thus, a JMP 
NEAR instruction is needed to allow the Detour Function to be 
placed outside of the API module (this is possible because the 
range of a JMP NEAR instruction if farther than a JMP 
SHORT instruction) [11] 
IV. TECHNICAL STUDY OF EXISTING TECHNIQUES 
A detailed observation on the working of existing API 
hooking techniques was made. For each API hooking 
technique, a sample ‘Hello World’ program is executed and the 
main memory of the sample program is observed, before and 
after an API hook has been initiated on the target program. 
Among the things that are observed includes changes to the 
Portable Executable (PE) file header in main memory, changes 
to the execution environment of a sample, and changes made to 
the memory region where the APIs being hooked are located. 
A. Findings on IAT Hook 
Due to the nature of IAT hook which does not modify 
memory address containing the API functions, there were no 
changes made to the memory content before and after IAT 
hook is in place, including to the entry points of APIs. 
However, there are noticeable changes being made to the IAT 
of the target application in main memory. 
 
 
Figure 5.  (a) CreateFileW with a 2 bytes ‘do-nothing’ instruction         
(MOV EDI, EDI) and 5 NOP instructions as padding                                      
(b) CreateFileW has been patched with a short jump                                  
(JMP SHORT 75D2CC51) and a near jump instruction (JMP 00401000) that 
points to a Detour Function (at address 00401000) 
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Figure 6 shows the change that happens to the IAT of the 
target application hooked using the IAT hooking technique. It 
can be seen that MessageBoxA is located somewhere in the 
range on 76F8XXXX while the modified IAT is pointing to 
memory address in the range of 005AXXXX. The change is 
very noticeable because the memory address in the IAT (after 
IAT is in place) is pointing towards a memory address which is 
outside of the range of address that belongs to the module that 
contains the MessageBoxA API. 
B. Findings on Debugger Hook 
Due to the use of breakpoints, debugger hook changes the 
entry point of APIs with a predictable instruction. Figure 7 
shows the presence of the INT3 instruction in both of the entry 
points of MessageBoxA and MessageBoxW. It was expected 
that all API hooking techniques causes some change to the 
memory of a target application. However, the changes made by 
Debugger Hook are very predictable in that it uses the same 
instruction (INT3) for patching the entry point of APIs for code 
redirection purposes. The INT3 instruction is a software break 
point that causes an exception to be thrown [11].  The 
instruction  is  not  normally found or used  in  a  normal  
application  since  an  unhandled exception could cause a 
program to crash [11]. The presence of a predictable INT3 
instruction at the entry point of APIs can therefore signifies the 




Figure 6.  IAT of target application located at address 0040200 (a) before 
IAT hooking, and (b) the change that happens after IAT hooking 
 
 
Figure 7.  The presence INT3 instruction (opcode CC) at entry points of APIs 
(b) compared to unhooked APIs in (a) 
Another interesting observation made was in the 
environment of the target application. When a debugger is used 
to debug a target program, the target program is loaded as a 
child process inside the debugger. However, when the target 
program is loaded without the use of a debugger, the target 
program runs as a child process of ‘explorer.exe’. Malware can 
check for this programmatically during runtime. Besides the 
abovementioned observations, debugger hook can also be 
detected using debugger detection techniques [14]. While the 
presence of a debugger might not signify that an API hooking 
is in place, malware authors most certainly do not want their 
code to be inspected and thus, might program their malware to 
change its behavior in the presence of a debugger. 
C. Findings on Inline Hook 
As expected, the need to change the entry point of APIs for 
API call hooking made Inline Hook easy to detect. However, 
instead of using the INT3 instruction like the Debugger Hook, 
a jump instruction (JMP) or a PUST-RET instruction combo is 
normally used (see Figure 8). It is therefore trivial to detect the 
presence of Inline hook that is, by searching the entry points of 
APIs for repeated patterns of a jump instruction (JMP) or a 
PUST-RET instruction combo, or simply, via the absence of a 
do-nothing instruction at the entry point of APIs. 
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Figure 8.  A predictable pattern of jump instructions at entry points of APIs 
hooked using the Inline Hook technique 
V. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING TECHNIQUES 
Currently, all existing Windows API call hooking 
technique can be detected in memory. IAT hooking is easy to 
detect since changes are guaranteed to be made to the PE’s 
IAT. Besides being easy to detect, IAT hook has a major 
drawback of not being able to capture dynamically loaded API 
[15]. Therefore, it is possible for malware to bypass an IAT 
hook altogether through dynamic invocation of API calls. 
Debugger hook does not suffer the same limitation but the 
changes that it made to the execution environment made it even 
easier to detect. The use of a predictable instruction at the entry 
point of API means that malware could do a simple if-else 
comparison to detect the present of breakpoints. Inline hook 
can be detected using more or less similar method but it seems 
to have the potential to be upgraded into a better API hooking 
technique due to the fact that code redirection can be achieved 
through several different ways.  Instead of using predictable 
jump instruction, probably an obfuscated code for code 
redirection would yield better stealth. However, care must be 
taken so as not to overwrite the no-operation instruction placed 
at the entry point of APIs as that is a trivial way to blow the 
cover. Obfuscation of code redirection instructions however, 
might not be feasible on very short pure user-mode API such as 
the IsDebuggerPresent API because of the short length of the 
API and the fact that such short and simple API can be 
compared byte-to-byte against a hard-coded version of the API 
in the malware’s binary, as a simple way of detecting possible 
tampering made to the API, which could imply the presence of 
an API call hooking techniques in memory. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is a need for a stealthy Windows API hooking 
technique for capturing malware’s API call. The technique 
must not make predictable changes to specific part of the 
memory or modify the execution environment of the target 
application. The technique must be able to redirect code 
execution from an API using unconventional ways (e.g. using 
code obfuscation) and do it in a manner that it would difficult 
for a trivial detection (e.g. if-else comparison). If modification 
must be made to the memory regions of the API, care must be 
taken so that the original functionality of the API is preserved. 
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